The Next Chapter in the Afghan-led Peace Process - HE President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani

 The Next Chapter in the Afghan-led Peace Process

By HE President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani
Geneva November 28, 2018
Owning the Peace

Tragedy is a daily occurrence in our lives. Each week, we lose on average one hundred Afghans, from all walks of life. The scale of violence inflicted on us is tragic.
How have Afghans reacted to this tragedy? With despair and hopelessness? No, in-stead, with powerful conviction and a true sense of urgency to seek an enduring and inclusive peace. Not the type of peace that comes from signing a piece of paper, but the type of peace that will enable us to address the deep roots of our inherited prob-lems from four decades of conflict.
Let me differentiate between a false sense of urgency and a true sense of urgency. False urgency consists of hurried actions without direction, often organized around political timelines, boxes ticked without coherence—this is a dangerous and superficial path to short-term peace that we must steer clear of.
A true sense of urgency means we are laser-focused on what lasting peace requires. True urgency allows us to focus on the critical issues, to define and own our problems, and to draw on our past and the experiences of other societies. It requires careful consideration of each aspect of peace-making, but also the courage to take risks and the assumption of responsibility for leading peace efforts.
The result of this thought process is the creation of a roadmap for a process and pro-grams that foster stability, security and inclusive growth atop the foundation of a democratic society.
The government of national unity is driven by a sense of true urgency for peace in our society. We have had this for years now, and we have already laid some critical ground-work for sustainable peace over the past five years. Our peace offering of February 28, 2018, for example, was derived from this sense of urgency. We made this offer without precondition.

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Through this offer, we sought a peace agreement in which the Taliban would be in-cluded in a democratic and inclusive society, respecting the following tenets:
1. The Constitutional rights and obligations, of all citizens, especially women, are ensured.
2. The Constitution is accepted, or amendments proposed through the constitu-tional provision.
3. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces and civil service function ac-cording to law.
4. No armed groups with ties to transnational terrorist networks or transnational criminal organizations, or with ties to state/non-state actors, seeking influence in Afghanistan will be allowed to join the political process.
Achieving these end goals clearly requires a sovereign and independent Afghanistan. We must not sacrifice sustainable peace to achieving short-term objectives, which would ultimately result in a renewal of old conflicts—this time on a larger scale—and which would condemn the current and future generations of Afghans to misery and destruction. We must end this conflict now, but once and for all.
Our framing for the peace process which I have just elaborated on has been renewed and refined through intensive consultations since February 2018, particularly in the weeks leading to the Geneva Conference.
Over the past eight months, I have consulted extensively with a wide variety of differ-ent groups of Afghans from across the country—women, youth, rural and urban dwell-ing citizens, civil society, current and former political elite and leaders. Each group shares a unique and important perspective, but the common threads resulting from these consultations is a strong renewal of:
1. Consensus on the credibility and importance of the 2004 Constitution
2. The necessity of our foundational partnership with the international community, and
3. That the Afghan government and society must lead and own the peace process.
The consultations have also resulted in expressions of strong fears. Many of those fears are regarding some ideas that have been floating around in the media: for exam-ple, a departure from the constitution through ill-thought arrangements, such as the proposal of an interim administration; the sacrifice of the rights of citizens in general, and women in particular; and the international community’s impending abandonment of this generation of young Afghans, which I believe will prove itself to be the greatest and most consequential generation in our contemporary history.
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I have listened to these fears and hopes, which has proven to me over and over again that Afghans fully understand peace and what it requires. Afghans are emotionally and mentally prepared now to overcome the past and own the future. And it has further strengthened my resolve and this government’s resolve to firmly own and lead the peace process.
That said, our society does have a strong desire for the international community to play a constructive role. This also includes Arab Islamic countries, our regional neigh-bors and international organizations.
As we work together in this pursuit of lasting peace, we must not repeat the experi-ence of 1992, where instead of stability and security, we were engulfed in massive conflict resulting in the destruction of our human, social and economic capital. Afghans will not become refugees again. We will not allow the gains to be lost through lack of focus and hotheadedness. We are determined to have clarity of vision, focused direc-tion, and deliberate action to voice, represent and safeguard the sacrifices of our na-tional defense and security forces and deliver on the hopes and aspirations of our peo-ple.
Leading the Peace
I will now turn to how we are leading the peace process and where we are right now in this process.
Our vision for peace is guided by Allah’s commandment, which was revealed in the Holy Quran (41:34):
“The good and the evil deed are not equal. Repel the evil deed with one which is better; then he, between whom and you there was enmity, will become as though a loyal, protecting friend.”
The Kabul process embodies this vision into distinctive lines of efforts, resulting in a comprehensive program of action. In February, we identified six areas for peace and stability. Let me provide an overview of the efforts in each area:
1. We coordinated unprecedented international and diplomatic support of the peace offer to the Taliban during Eid-al-Fitr this year. The NATO Summit this year in July was a ringing endorsement of our peace offer and the June cease-fire. We thank all of our international partners, particularly the United States,
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for systematically supporting the Kabul Process. We also thank all of you today for making peace an integral part of a conference that was first designed to take stock of mutual commitment in the development arena. I would also like to recognize and thank China, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and India for their efforts on multiple levels—bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral —to en-gage in a constructive dialogue on peace efforts.
2. We thank Uzbekistan for convening the Tashkent Conference to align various efforts by countries and regional organizations with the Kabul Process. Tash-kent provided a model that flows from the international principle of equality of sovereign states, as the meeting was jointly prepared by the Afghan govern-ment and co-chaired by Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Adherence to the princi-ple of sovereignty and respect for the ownership and leadership of Afghanistan is crucial to ensuring the stability, security and prosperity of Afghanistan in the region.
3. We are pleased to acknowledge the close cooperation and consensus of the global Islamic community to counter the use of religious text as justification of unrestricted war. We thank the government and the Ulema of Indonesia for convening and hosting a gathering of Afghan, Pakistani and Indonesian scholars in Jakarta on May this year, where false and misguided notions of violence against civilians and the use of suicide bombings were explicitly declared as “against the holy principles of Islam.” We also thank the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The religious justification for conflict has been stripped of validity by the conference of Ulema in Indonesia, the OIC gathering of promi-nent muftis from across the Muslim world, by the passionate addresses of imams in the Holy cities of Makkah and Madina and by prominent supporters of His Highness King Salman Ibn Abdulazziz Al-Saud, the custodian of the holy shrines. What we have achieved today, from an Islamic perspective, is consen-sus. Those pariahs in the Islamic world have since emerged—radical terrorists wrongly claiming to be engaged in Islamic jihad, and their state sponsors.
4. We asked for a concerted global effort to persuade Pakistan to engage in a com-prehensive state-to-state dialogue and to support the peace offer to the Tali-ban. That global effort is now in place. On paper, state to state discussions have resulted in an agreement, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Reconciliation. Progress on the ground, however, is negligible. Movement from agreement to action is lacking from Pakistan.
5. and The fifth and sixth elements are our requests for support in the implemen-tation of the peace agreement, and support of peace building initiatives, through trade, transit and investment, as well as support of our government
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reform agenda and anti-corruption strategy in the build up to the forthcoming 2019 presidential elections.
We are pleased to acknowledge that a constructive dialogue is in place, as manifested in this conference.
Moving forward to build upon the work we have already done, we argue that realiza-tion of our vision requires compassion, conviction and courage in dealing with the Tal-iban.
The June 2018 Eid-al-Fitr ceasefire showed the conviction of the Ulema, the courage of the government and security forces and the compassion of our people.
An unprecedented gathering of 2,906 Afghan Islamic scholars issued a unified fatwa—a declaration restating the commandment of Allah of the necessity of peace, and the tenants of Islamic principles and sharia law on the rejection of violence as a method of resolving disputes between Muslims. The Ulema urged the government and the Tali-ban to declare a ceasefire.
The government was propelled by our sense of true urgency to muster courage and conviction — within four days of the Ulema’s meeting, we called for a ceasefire.
The logic of the Ulema was so compelling that the Taliban responded positively and accepted the ceasefire and complied, except for a few small isolated incidents.
The compassion shown by Afghan citizens was truly impressive—what happened com-pletely changed the political landscape, it challenged our conceptions of ourselves, and it altered the possibilities for our future. Over 30,000 Taliban fighters, mostly young people, came to the cities and joined in intense dialogue with their fellow citi-zens, conversing with members of armed forces, engaging in dialogue with women activists, praying in mosques with their fellow Muslims, and breaking bread with gov-ernment officials and citizens from all walks of life in local halls across the country. After 39 years, Afghan children had a true holiday where they could go out, play and visit with friends and relatives.
Three things standout about the ceasefire.
1. Despite the loss of nearly 1,000 lives in the week before the ceasefire, Afghan society reinforced its firm commitment to compassion and the need to move forward, not look back.
2. Contrary to assertions that Taliban fighters will never accept peace, young Tal-iban fighters that day repeatedly asserted that they are sick and tired of vio-lence.
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3. Our security forces displayed steadfast courage and heroism, both before and after the ceasefire. They proved that they are true guardians of Afghanistan’s stability and security and firmly committed to following the lead of their elected leader.
Let me elaborate now on our National Defense and Security Forces.
Their sacrifice is inspiring strong patriotism in this nation. As commander in chief, I could not be more proud of our defense and security forces. In the past four years, the security forces have moved from being once referred to as a mercenary force by past leaders, to being the most trusted government institution in the nation. Afghans are full of pride for them.
On the January 1, 2015, the Afghan national security forces assumed with pride the full responsibility for our freedom and global security, here on the frontlines of the war on terror. Since then, the international losses have been 59 armed forces, while their total losses from 2001 to 2014 was 3,458. But since January 2015, we Afghans have lost a staggering 28,529 of our Afghan sons and daughters.
This is not a number. These were precious lives, many of them breadwinners for their families, our nation’s pride. I will not stand idol and witness yet another generation of Afghans lost to war and bloodshed. Let me repeat, peace is our nation’s imperative.
We gratefully acknowledge the Resolute Support mission of train, advise and assist. But it should be crystal clear here today that Afghans are fighting and dying, not only for our constitutional order, sovereignty, national unity and the right to life and hap-piness of the current and future generations of Afghans, but also to defend a front line that guards the rest of the world from the global threat of international terrorism.
I ask for a moment of silence, in honor of both Afghan and international security forces and the thousands of civilians who have been martyred in defense of our rights as a people, a nation, and a state.
Moment of Silence
Thank you. Ensuring the functioning of our defense and security forces and our civil service according to the law is an absolutely essential element to enduring peace and security.
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The Nature and Dimensions of War
A true sense of urgency, on the one hand, requires clarity of strategic focus, reasoned discourse, calmness and deliberation. On the other hand, the daily pain and suffering inflicted upon our people and our institutions, capabilities and capitals, is intense, re-lentless, and horrific. Unspeakable crimes are being committed against the Afghan people.
What is being practiced against our society and people is best characterized as unre-strained war— there is not a single sphere of our life that has not been attacked. Public streets, hospitals, mosques, universities, places of business, sports centers, schools.
The most recent attack on November 22 crossed all boundaries. A large gathering of Ulema celebrating the birthday of the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, and listening to the recitation of the Holy Quran in a hotel were attacked by a suicide bomber.
The enormity of the crime is an indication that this conflict, which is being imposed upon us, has crossed all boundaries of decency, humanity, and the injunctions of all religions on peace, particularly the message of tolerance and peace which emanated from the Prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him.
This is unrestrained warfare. Its ever-changing character is driven by four dimensions:
1. Trans-national terrorist networks have targeted us since the hijacking of our country by Al-Qaeda in the 1990s. In their warped narrative, destruction of the Afghan society and state is a means for their world-wide destructive objec-tives—a reign of terror. They have nothing to offer the Afghan people. They have taken advantage of our strategic location in order to inflict pain on the region and the world. Afghanistan is the not their objective but instead a critical site, a launch pad, for these networks—this fact very unfortunately brings the misguided from across the world to deliver death and destruction to our soci-ety. Today, we have over a dozen transnational terrorists networks operating in Afghanistan.
2. Transnational criminal organizations are the second drivers of conflict. In the same way that the cocaine cartels have driven the conflict in Colombia, the her-oine cartels are a major driver of instability and violence in our country. The total farm-gate price of opium in Afghanistan for 2017 recorded was 1.4 billion USD, and 0.6 billion USD in 2018. But the street value in Europe, Russia, Aus-tralia and now Canada runs into the hundreds of billions. Our collective failure to design and implement an agricultural transformation of Afghanistan has not
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only resulted in perpetuation of poverty and inequality but has also provided the enabling conditions for transnational criminal organizations to exploit Af-ghan farmers.
3. The third dimension is the failure of some neighboring countries – and one in particular – to fulfill all their obligations under UN conventions against terror-ism. Unfortunately, the Afghan government’s efforts to reduce violence gener-ated by Taliban attacks and protect our people is undercut by this repetitive failure. Even as the ANDSF confront the Taliban and disrupt networks planning attacks against Afghan civilians, some neighboring countries have not cooper-ated fully in reducing and eliminating the Taliban’s ability to recruit, train and support fighters inside Afghanistan. If we were dealing with a conflict that only had national dimensions, the war would have been over a long time ago. We have repeatedly stated to our neighbors that our relations must address three critical dimensions: 1) removal of a specter of violence emanating from the re-gion, 2) defining a normal and cooperative relationship between all countries in the region; and 3) agreeing on a framework of counter-terrorism.
4. The Afghan Taliban are the fourth driver of conflict. They are Afghan by origin and therefore as a nation and a state, we must deal with and resolve the differ-ences that divide us and embrace common goals that will unite us. It is with this premise that we made an unconditional offer of negotiations with the Afghan Taliban. We argue that the platform provided by the Taliban has enabled the other three drivers. Our question to the Taliban is: would you like to be the sacrificial lamb of these entities, kill your fellow Afghan citizens, and die to the very last one of you, for the sake of the self-serving agendas of others? Let me be explicit—the Taliban have a clear choice at this point, which we present to them—choose to act as Afghans, or accept the manipulation by entities that have no vision for our collective future as a people, or respect for our dignity, freedom and sovereignty.
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Negotiations with the Taliban
What is our approach now moving forward?
To bring an end to this unrestrained war, we have to deal with the national and the regional Islamic dimensions, as well as the drivers of the conflict. The compassion, con-viction and courage required for dealing with the Taliban manifest in our February of-fer and our subsequent leadership on follow-up actions, which I discussed above.
Here, I would like to share some announcements and highlight our most recent think-ing on negotiations with the Taliban and how we are proceeding.
1. First of all, I am pleased to announce that our 12-member negotiating team is ready, and presidential chief of staff Salam Rahimi will lead the negotiation team. He is a man who has imminent Jihadi and civil society credentials. The team includes women and men who have the necessary credentials to deal with the key challenges of peace, particularly with a focus on a feasible and credible implementation plan.
2. Second, to ensure consensus and to provide direction to the negotiating team, I also announce the formation of diverse groups of individuals into a peace ad-visory board which will serve as a network of networks to provide timely advice on critical issues in peace negotiations. The peace advisory board will be com-prised of nine committees addressing various segments of our society.
3. Third, the High Peace Council, based on their own request and with support from the government, will be restructured to focus on public awareness and will provide advice and input to the government regarding post-peace scenar-ios.
4. Fourth, let me clarify our proposed approach to negotiations. We aim to first arrive at a list of key issues from both the Taliban’s side and the government’s side, then to classify and categorize these into a table of contents of key issues. We will then assign each of the key topics to a joint committee, where both sides of the negotiating teams, and other Afghans with necessary skills, will be brought in. The key members of the two negotiating teams—government and Taliban—will focus on the key issues that divide us and which need to be re-solved.
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5. Negotiations will happen in phases. We propose the following sequencing of phases:
a. Phase one will be intra-Afghan, where we deal with the key six building blocks of peace.
i. The first building block is a political process: ceasefire, recognition of the Afghan Taliban as a political party, transitional confidence-building arrangements and inclusive, credible, free and fair elec-tions.
ii. The second building block is the legal framework: constitutional review, justice and resolution of grievances, enabling laws or de-crees, prisoner release and removal from sanctions lists.
iii. The third building block is reorganization of the state: rule of law and reform, balanced spatial development, reintegration of refu-gees and internally displaced populations.
iv. The fourth building block of peace is security: for the public, as well as for the reconcilable who are being reintegrated.
v. The fifth building block of peace is social and economic develop-ment: inclusive and sustained growth, equitable access to land and public assets, fighting corruption, national job creation pro-grams, reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants.
vi. And the sixth building block of peace is support and partnership with the international community: diplomatic and financial sup-port, status of foreign fighters and removal from sanctions lists.
b. Phase two will involve joint discussions with Pakistan, the United States, and NATO. Relations between NATO, the US and Afghanistan are gov-erned by the Status of Forces Agreement, the Strategic Partnership Com-pact, and the Bilateral Security Agreement. All are public documents and duly ratified by consultative loya jirgas and the parliament of Afghani-stan. Relations between the Taliban and Pakistan however are shrouded in mystery. The UN charter has enshrined the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states. This relationship needs to be clarified.
c. Phase three will require participation of the regional actors ranging from China, India, Russia and Turkey to our immediate neighbors.
d. Phase four will be garnering support from the Arab-Islamic world, includ-ing Indonesia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
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e. Phase 5 will be garnering support from NATO and non-NATO member states, and developmental partners who have generously supported us both on the battlefield and in our development efforts.
f. The result of this phased approach will be an inclusive and comprehen-sive peace agreement that engages all stake holders at the appropriate times.
6. To ensure commitment and to also display commitment of the Afghan govern-ment, we propose three critical measures.
I. First, putting implementation front and center—meaning a time-bound implementation plan will be part of the peace agreement.
II. Second, confidence-building measures upon the commencement of peace talks will also continue during the negotiations, to ensure the com-mitment of the government during the first year of peace is genuine. We propose front-loading those undertakings, which will require political will.
III. Third, a national mechanism of ratification will be agreed upon during the discussions. These could be any appropriate body, such as the par-liament, a loya jirga (as specified in the constitution), or by a referendum.
Now, the question that is often raised is the relation between peace and the forth-coming presidential elections. Let me get to the heart of the matter directly—we need an elected government with a mandate to obtain ratification, implement the peace agreement, and lead the societal reconciliation process. I can guarantee you that any other government would have refused to engage in its last months with an issue as significant as peace.
However, Dr. Abdullah and I each ran on a platform of peace and feel that it is our calling and responsibility to act on the national imperative to push the peace process as far as we possibly can in the time allotted to us by the vote of the Afghan public in 2014.
But let it be crystal clear though that implementation of our proposed peace process will minimally require a period of five years. We will have to reintegrate approximately 4 million Afghans that are living as refugees in Iran and Afghanistan.
We should not forget that 40% of Afghans are living below the poverty line and that environmental change and drought is reeking havoc both in the lives of our people and
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the destruction of our natural capital – our pasture lands, water basins and other nat-ural resources. These matters also require immediate attention.
However, given the national consensus on peace, I am confident that leading presi-dential candidates will join us in acting on the national sense of true urgency to get to an agreement. The presidential elections provide the appropriate platform for a truly national discussion on ending the conflict and ensuring sustainable and lasting peace.
Regional Consensus
Given that we have been in conflict for 39 years and over 4 million Afghan refugees are residing in neighboring countries, peace in Afghanistan requires renewal of the regional consensus.
After the tragedy of 9/11, the regional consensus on a stable Afghanistan was sponta-neous. Today, however, the regional consensus needs to be actively recreated, as some actors either see us as part of a broader chess game with their rivals or are un-certain of stability. We argue that a stable Afghanistan is essential to regional cooper-ation, stability and prosperity. We suggest a change of focus in the following five areas.
1. First, we must change the perception of Afghanistan as a site of danger or a battle ground for proxy warfare, to a platform of cooperation by location and by strategic perspective. Afghanistan is a roundabout for the mutually benefi-cial exchange of data, goods, and ideas. In the past five years, we have offered constructive ideas and followed up on them to demonstrate in practice that a cooperative advantage outweighs the competitive drive between our regional neighbors. At the Shanghai Conference, we articulated this view and were grateful that many leaders, including India, China and Uzbekistan, strongly en-dorsed this change in perspective.
2. Second, this change of perspective should be followed by a change of policy. Our relationships with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan are an illustration of how changed policies have led to a massive in-crease in economic cooperation and governmental coordination. Thanks to the change in perspective and policies, Afghanistan today is an integral part of cen-tral Asia. The air corridor with India and now with China, Turkey and Europe is another illustration on how change in policies can bring mutual and enduring benefits.
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3. Third, we emphatically seek peace with all of our neighbors. We have not posed a threat to any of our neighbors—it is simply not in our national interest. More-over, without Afghanistan as a bridge—there can be no sustained economic linkages between South Asia and Central Asia.
4. Fourth, we need a coordinated regional endorsement and appropriate guaran-tees of peace with the Taliban.
5. Fifth, we feel that there is a regional imperative to create agreement on secu-rity, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics, and create the appropriate or-ganizational instruments for ensuring systematic and sustained attention, to safeguard our collective security and well-being. The regional environment does not operate on the basis of political boundaries. Water management is essential to our collective interests. We suggest coordination both in terms of response to natural disasters and emergencies, and to preservation and stew-ardship of our common natural capital, ranging from forests to water resources.
International Consensus
Let me express gratitude on behalf of the Afghan people for the strong international support extended to Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11. Neither blood nor treasure was spared to help us realize the vision and the dreams of the Afghan nation which we strongly articulated in the emergency loya jirga of 2002 and the constitutional loya jirga of 2004.
Some Afghan leaders wasted the golden opportunity of heightened international sup-port and did not nurture these partnerships or deliver on the aspiration of our people. Why? This is better left to the judgement of history.
As far as the government of national unity is concerned, we have succeeded against all odds and in the face of immense violence to own our problems and the solutions and move forward on the basis of national consensus. To ensure that our common goal of peace is achieved, we suggest five areas of focus for our international partners.
1. First, continue in a supporting role as we Afghans take the lead. We not only know our problems but have shown the capability, the judgement and the per-severance to lead under trying circumstances without losing a sense of direc-tion or priority. Peace is our national imperative and we commit to sacrifices that responsibility and leadership demands of us.
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2. Second, the Bilateral Security Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement were entered into by a sovereign Afghan state, with the US and NATO. Discussion of these agreements and any changes to them can only be negotiated through discussion, per agreement of the signing parties. Our armed forces, whose sac-rifices have known no bounds, need clarity and assurance that their newly-found capacities and capabilities are not going to be compromised and frittered away.
3. Third, sovereign rights are the hallmark and foundation of the current interna-tional order. The government of national unity has pursued a clear and system-atic agenda of reforms. We will be sharing achievements and steps forward in our reforms agenda in various side events and the plenary of this conference. Respecting these sovereign rights minimally requires coordination and co-chair-ing of any discussion on peace. There cannot be double standards. Any breach of our sovereignty will be met with a strong reaction from our people who throughout the course of history have embraced those who come in friendship, but have resisted aggression and invasion at all costs.
4. Fourth, we should start discussions on international endorsements and guaran-tees of the peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Given the multi-dimensional conflicts that are being waged over Afghanistan, we need imagination and the best of diplomatic skills to think through arrange-ments that can secure Afghanistan’s future, including ensuring Afghanistan can provide for its own security without the permanent presence of foreign forces. Of course, a coordinated effort to eliminate the threat posed by transnational terrorist organizations is an essential and necessary step for ensuring that the sacrifices in blood and treasure of our international partners will not be in vain.
5. Fifth, arriving at an enduring and lasting peace requires inputs and an agreed-upon process of endorsement by our international partners. Agreeing to the phased sequence that we have suggested today, or offering alternative se-quences, will be helpful to the success of the process. The area where we will need maximum support is in thinking through the requirements of a post-peace agreement Afghanistan.
As we will highlight in the plenary session, Afghanistan is committed to pursuing a roadmap of self-reliance by 2024, marking the end of the decade of transformation. Fortunately, Afghanistan has been endowed with the natural capital to achieve self-reliance. Therefore, our emphasis is not to seek more aid but to change the modalities of aid to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and transparency and to seek connectivity
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with the region, and trade, transit and investment from the rest of the world. A dy-namic economy focused on inclusive growth and directed towards the goal of poverty reduction, and then poverty elimination, is essential to a lasting peace.
Absorption of ex-combatants, assisting the Afghan Taliban to transform themselves into a political party and creating mechanisms to address their legitimate grievances and building trust through confidence building measures are ingredients to ensuring true reconciliation.
Reconciliation is also going to be a social process where we accept each other in ear-nest. This in turn requires equal attention to the process of nation-building within the framework of rights and obligations of our constitution.
Afghan women and youth are crucial to this journey from chaos, conflict, criminality and corruption to stability, peace, prosperity and inclusion. Millions of Afghans whose lives are today lived in the shadow of fear, must embrace hope and create the oppor-tunities to allow us to be the makers of our destiny.
I hope and pray that we will be able to deliver on our vision of peace and the program necessary to make sure it is a credible and lasting peace. We count on your support and we thank you for engaging with us.

 

Can civil society save Afghanistan?

This piece was published in the AfPak channel of the Foreign Policy
By Lael Mohib and Hamdullah Mohib

In a speech earlier this year to commemorate the reign of King Amanullah, Afghanistan's reformist king during the 1920's, Afghan President Hamid Karzai focused on the younger generation's contribution to the country's future: ‘'This is a steady wheel that is progressively moving toward more development, and it will not turn back," he said. "This is a young man's engine with a power that does not know cold or any other obstacles."

While the country's social development has seemed to move backwards since the 1920's, the Afghan youth of today make up the country's most encouraging hope for progression, though they do face obstacles. The formation of a variety of civil society organizations over the past 10 years, initiated and operated primarily by a younger generation of Afghans seemingly frustrated into motivation, has a central role to play in the course of the country's future.

This generation was born and has come of age during a time that forced many Afghan families to flee to neighboring or Western countries, where they took advantage of opportunities for education and intellectual development. Those who remained in Afghanistan saw enough to know they wanted a different future. According to Afghanistan's Central Statistics Organization, 76 percent of the population is under the age of 35 . Enrollment in higher education is at an all-time high - a 25 percent increase in university intake in 2012 compared to the previous year from 84,184 to 112,367. Though the quality of education is relatively low, the number of Afghans striving for an education attests to the country's desire to be educated.

Educated youths, mainly residing in urban areas, make up a cadre of young intellectuals and professionals that populate a large part of the public and private sector, from Afghan media, governmental bureaucracy, and diplomatic circles to, most importantly, civil society. They are in positions to have their voices heard in ways that influence their peers and set new standards of expectations from their leaders. This is bolstered by the scope and reach of social networking media as a tool for voicing opinion, which has forced even the Taliban to adopt tools such as Twitter in order to engage wider audiences. Another key characteristic of this generation is that they come from all different types of backgrounds-they are children of the diaspora, the mujahideen, and the communists, yet they share a common goal.

While the influence of this generation is invariably limited by the obstacles of the surroundings in which they operate, one area that has particularly flourished with the involvement of youth is civil society, a sector of Afghan society that is dominated by the ideals and optimism of the entrepreneurial and socially progressive mood of many young, educated Afghans. The 4,280 civil society and non-governmental organizations registered in Afghanistan take many shapes and forms--from social responsibility and charity groups addressing issues such as women's and children's rights, the rights of the disabled, civic engagement, education, and environmental campaigns, to professional groups that bring together entrepreneurs and practitioners in various sectors including health, telecommunications, and economic development.

Two such exemplary organizations are Young Women for Change (YWC), a social organization advocating women's rights, and the National ICT Alliance of Afghanistan (NICTAA), a consortium of information and communication technology (ICT) entities working to forward the industry in Afghanistan. Established in 2011, YWC, the group of young Afghan women, and even some men, raises awareness of women's rights. The group has been highly vocal and visible in advocating for change, most notably in the summer of 2011 when male and female YWC members staged a public march to protest sexual harassment of women in the streets. More recently, the group opened Afghanistan's first women-only internet café .

NICTAA, as a consortium of information and communication technology (ICT) professionals established in 2008, brings together ICT actors in the public and private sector and academia to work toward the advancement and development of this sector in Afghanistan, an area that brings significant investment in the country, an estimated 1.7 billion USD as of June 2012 .The organisation has represented Afghanistan's ICT sector at conferences worldwide , and is unique in that it works closely with the government to create opportunities in the sector in Afghanistan.

At a recent parliamentary inquiry in the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, responded to multiple questions about how progress on women and human rights would be ensured post-2014 by referencing the British government's new program for strengthening civil society organisations. His argument was that by strengthening Afghan civil society, such organisations could in turn hold their government to account, and challenge its response to women and human rights.

While civil society organizations (CSOs) do hold a critical mirror to reflect the country's key issues, both positive and negative, and provide platforms for the public to respond, engage, and challenge social, professional, or economic policies and issues, they do face serious obstacles, mainly due to the lack of an enabling environment. Due to poor security, most groups are based from urban centers, with operations and progress mainly confined to Afghanistan's cities and out of reach of the nearly 80% of Afghans residing in rural areas.

Moreover, of the thousands of CSOs registered with the government, it's unclear how many are inactive or were set up as a means for channelling funds. Civil society has not escaped the touch of corruption plaguing Afghanistan, either. The government has not shied away from taking action against organisations that have been vocal in challenging them, most recently the controversial dismissal of the head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, allegedly over the pending publication of a report accusing high-ranking cabinet members of past human rights violations.

Despite these challenges, CSOs do present an opportunity to put forth and encourage change in Afghan society and policy . In a country where well-established, national political parties with clear strategic visions have not fully developed, the country risks floating from one power-holder to the next without the reform that often comes from healthy party rivalries and change of administrations.

The collective influences and achievements of civil society organisations at all levels of Afghan society need to be consolidated at a national level, especially in the face of uncertainty beyond 2014, as a way to fill that void. Uniting civil society organisations in a sort of national-level consortium would be a massive undertaking, not only due to the sheer number of groups, but also due to the range of differing topics and issues covered; however, a common overarching goal arguably underlies civil society groups in Afghanistan that only their united support could help advance: a peaceful and progressive future for the country geared toward economic, social, and educational advancement and stability.

There are non-Taliban poets in the 'Poetry of the ...

Hanan Habibzai: There are non-Taliban poets in the 'Poetry of the ...: By Hanan Habibzai It is truly a matter of controversy as it appears that non-Taliban Afghan poets are presented as Taliban. It is a mat...

An inclusive peace

This piece was published in the AfPak channel of the Foreign Policy

Afghan history shows that peace is only as wholesome as the interest of the peacemakers involved. In 1988, then-president Mohammad Najibullah tried to present the Geneva Accords -- which were supposed to bring peace after the Soviet war -- as a symbol of national unity, and his administration as a nationalist movement. Instead, the mujahideen were excluded from the peace process, and several government officials, including one of Najibullah's top generals, Abdul Rashid Dostum, were on the verge of switching allegiances. The president's efforts fell short because they were not inclusive, and because Najibullah underestimated the threat posed by elements within his own government. The Accords eventually dissolved into the blur of civil war.

These same mistakes were repeated by the mujahideen when they took power in 1992. Families around the country celebrated when Najibullah's regime fell in 1992, and Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was selected to be the first president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. (My father went so far as to name his new-born grandson after the new president). It was deemed a mujahideen victory, and those associated with Najibullah's regime were at the very least excluded from the new government. Many were forced to flee for their lives.

Unfortunately, the newly achieved peace -- won by force and dealt exclusively amongst the mujahideen victors-- didn't last very long. A civil war soon broke out amongst the same mujahideen factions whose collective victory we had been celebrating.

The exclusiveness of both of these failed peace efforts presents lessons for the peace process today. While they are a central element, talks with the Afghan Taliban are only the tip of the iceberg in a comprehensive, meaningful peace for Afghanistan. There are other groups, equally as essential to a holistic Afghan peace, that must also be included. An Afghan-led approach to the peace process that pragmatically acknowledges the realities of the political scene in Afghanistan and engages all groups with equal scrutiny must be pursued with one common denominator shared by all: Afghanistan's national interest.

Over ten years of foreign intervention, war and power struggle, and with Karzai's final term coming to an end in 2014, each stakeholder in Afghan peace has their own political goals and interests that he believes are worth fighting for. The United States will want to leave with dignity, Karzai will seek to assert Afghan sovereignty and establish his legacy, the Taliban will want to capitalize politically on their gains on the battlefield, and opposition groups will grapple to retain their power as political space is made for the Quetta Shura.  But ideologies and political interests aside, realities must be central to this process to avoid past mistakes that resulted in civil war.

For one, despite their controversial policies, the Afghan Taliban is a political group and military force to be reckoned with.  Scores of foreign forces have failed to contend militarily with the Taliban to their desired extent for the past decade. In retrospect, the willingness (and now almost eagerness) shown by the U.S. and NATO to reach a political settlement with the Taliban takes us full circle to where we were over 10 years ago -- the U.S., with the assistance of Northern Alliance militias armed with U.S.-supplied weapons and cash, pushed the Taliban from power in Kabul.  The Taliban were not reconciled at that crucial point, or allowed any political space, and their ability to revive themselves as a substantial military threat was underestimated.

Now, they have in a sense gained the upper hand in the battlefield, maintaining a stalemate with the Afghan National Army and foreign forces. With the establishment of a shadow government across much of Afghanistan, and plans to open a diplomatic office in Qatar, the reality now is that the Taliban are an Afghan political group. They are bringing that upper hand to the negotiation table. This could not be exhibited better than by their announcement Thursday to suspend the peace talks with the U.S., which shows their ability to take advantage of opportunities to assert their control of the situation.

Secondly, the Taliban are not the only group that needs to be reconciled. The peace process must bring in the Taliban on equal terms, while also leveraging the potentially violent reactions of groups who staunchly oppose any reconciliation with the Taliban. These opposition groups make up mainly ethnic minority groups headed by former Northern Alliance commanders whose militias fought against the Taliban and each other during the civil war. They were heavily supported financially and militarily by the United States in 2001 to oust the Taliban, and today, some fill ministerial and other government positions, arguably bestowed by Karzai as a means of subjugation. Others are regional strongmen with de facto rule in their respective areas.

These are some of the same figureheads who nurtured the civil war in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and achieving some level of power is still in each group's agenda. These groups comprise a viable threat as they are well-armed, financially sound, and many hold positions of power -- positions they will fight to retain as hostility rises at the talk of Taliban negotiations.  The former head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh, now represents the recently formed United Front in its campaign against the Karzai government and Taliban reconciliation. He was recently quoted in an interview saying, "Fighting is not a very sophisticated path. It's easy. And (so is) recruiting people to fight in this country where unemployment is more than 50 percent. To believe that only one group can fight is naïveté."

These opposition movement leaders have made brazen moves in a bid to gain support in the build-up to talks with the Taliban. Most notably,in January, 2012, they met with four members of the U.S. House of Representatives in Germany in a meeting not condoned by the U.S. State Department, to discuss a controversial agenda that included discussion about how to decentralize power and consolidate the opposition's regional power, a move that would potentially divide the country into north and south.  The meeting was condemned by the Afghan government as an unconstitutional move against Afghan national unity, and was an embarrassment for the United States.

Efforts should be made and sustained to reach out not just to the Taliban, but to all groups that have a stake in Afghanistan's political future, hostile or otherwise, on the same level. This includes non-Taliban insurgent groups such as the Haqqani Network and Hizbi-Islami Gulbuddin. An Afghan-led process is the best route to peace in Afghanistan. Though compromised in his ability to lead the peace process due to the U.S. negotiation efforts in Qatar and the denial of the Afghan government by the Taliban, Afghan President Hamid Karzai must strive to be diplomatic and inclusive in consistent efforts to initiate a sincere peace process.  His sporadic attitude toward talking to the Taliban -- ranging from support to hesitation - is indicative of his attempts to control the peace process in order to reassert his legacy and sovereignty. Consistency in his efforts to unite all groups and foster an Afghan-led process should be his focus.

However, Karzai's ability to make headway is restricted -- first of all, the U.S. may trump his efforts; and secondly, the Taliban and other opposition groups may refuse his invitations to talk in order to make a political statement showing their rejection of the Afghan government. These factors make it difficult for the peace process to be effectively led by the Afghan government. Karzai should reach out to each group equally, initiating and maintaining unconditional dialogues. Peace is built on a foundation of trust.

In order to include all groups on an equal level and provide a platform for the voices of ordinary Afghan citizens-who are undoubtedly the biggest proponents of peace -- a traditional Loya Jirga could be organized and held by a neutral entity, or a coalition, at a neutral location. The agenda would be pre-set and focused around specific objectives geared toward peace. The organizers and location would need to be neutral to reduce the risk that it would be boycotted by the very groups it would seek to bring in. A national, sincere discussion through traditional Afghan dialogue that places all groups on a level playing field is the country's closest chance to achieve peace. This would be the beginning to a process cleansed of the divisive nature of political manoeuvrings.

If abused by opportunists with divisive political ambitions and interest, the fragile peace process in Afghanistan will result in nothing more than another hollow attempt that precedes yet another civil war - a fear that haunts Afghans.  Realities must be accepted by all groups in order to make political space for one another, groups who would otherwise start fighting, or keep fighting, if they are denied. It would be an unfortunate repeat of history if the results of this peace deal do not bring celebrations to every Afghan household, regardless of their background.

The ‘Steve Jobs Approach’ to Afghan Peace

I had promised in my campaign speech for the presidency of the Brunel Afghan Society in 2006 that if elected, I would expand it beyond Brunel to make it a UK-wide association. But once I actually got elected, I realized I had no idea how to fulfil my promise and I was doubtful I had the time and skills to do so. What made it more of a challenge was that I got an internship that year in Swindon about 80 miles away from the university. It was challenging to keep a job, and recreate an organisation remotely. Despite my own fears and doubts, I ended up making the best of my situation and succeeded in creating what is now called the Afghan Student’s Association UK (ASAUK).  In part due to a speech I heard.

A friend who was my class mate, house mate and a colleague that year, with whom I discussed life philosophies over many nights of procrastination at university labs, introduced me to Steve Jobs’ commencement speech at Stanford University delivered in 2005. I never was a Mac person and still am not – the only Apple product I use now is my iPhone--so I did not know who Steve Jobs was at that time. Regardless, the speech had a profound effect on me and I keep going back to it to this day—I find it applies to lots of life situations. In his speech, Jobs’ primary point is that if you haven’t found what you are looking for in life, you must keep looking and never settle. He used his battle with cancer as one analogy to prove his point—he said he won his battle with cancer and was in remission.

The last few months of Afghan political turmoil had been drawing a shadow of doubt and fear in my mind. There is a running joke between some of my friends and I about how Afghans have survived three decades of war—we tend to blame our problems on the wars, and use it as an excuse to never take responsibility for and control of our own future. Though we laugh, we need to realize that the past cannot be undone, and there is no point dwelling on it or never making an effort to escape its grasp. The situation in Afghanistan is shadowy and the future is not looking very bright—there is a strong possibility of a civil war.

Several years after first hearing Jobs’ Stanford speech, I read his biography which revealed that during that speech, he actually still had cancer and was going through treatment for it. What struck me was that despite the cancer, he continued doing what he was passionate about and didn’t want sympathy for what nature had bestowed upon him. Jobs refused to settle for defeat to cancer. It made me revisit his theory and I felt shame for having initially accepted defeat by having doubt. Our human nature makes us blame our circumstances or situation for what in fact is our own self-doubt and fear; thus, we declare ourselves powerless to take control, and we settle for what we take for granted as our fate.

The possibility of civil war can only become certain if and when we, as Afghans, settle for it—when we succumb to the doubts, fear, and turmoil that would lead to civil war. There is still time to take responsibility and control, and not stand by powerlessly. We can still change the future. True, fighting is easy to do, but talking is easier, and that is the first step to peace. The past belongs to the generations before us but the future belongs to us and it is us who will be blamed or praised for how we shape that future. We can learn from the experiences of the previous generation but not without putting it under a moral microscope, to make sure we don’t repeat the mistakes they committed, and to improve on what they did right. The answers are not easy to find—we must create them. So let’s keep looking and not settle.

Afghan solutions for Afghan women

This article first appeared on the AfPak channel of Foreign Policy
How to Really Help Afghanistan's Women

Audiences around the world were horrified to see the image of Bibi Aisha, a young Afghan girl whose nose had been cut off by her husband and his family, on the cover of an August 2010 issue of TIME Magazine. Western media outlets largely attributed Aisha's case to the Taliban, and portrayed it as a warning of what is to come for Afghan women once the international community withdraws from Afghanistan.  The unfortunate reality is, though, that there are many other cases like hers happening today in Afghanistan, despite the presence and efforts of foreign troops and the international community over the last decade. The most recent case to make headlines was that of 15-year-old Sahar Gul, who had been locked in a basement and tortured for five months by her in-laws, allegedly because she refused efforts to force her into prostitution. These crimes were not perpetrated by the Taliban, but instead some of the most extreme manifestations of domestic violence in Afghanistan.

As former Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil said to me in an interview a year ago when I asked what he thought about the case of Bibi Aisha: "Even when the West are in Afghanistan, these things are still happening. It seems to me to be a family matter, what happened to this woman."In Afghanistan, everything is a family matter, and familial ties will continue to govern Afghan society long after international troops have left the scene. While attention is focused in Kabul on signing documents ensuring women's political participation and securing women's rights, there is very little trickle down from such progress to the majority of Afghan women living in rural areas. Instead of working from the top down, sustainable progress that can take root in conservative Afghan households can only be made by accepting the realities of rural Afghan society and working within existing cultural boundaries.

Taking a step back from the ‘quick impact' approach of mainstream international aid,one must consider the social realities of Afghanistan  to define and support sustainable progress on women's socio economic and human rights. In reality, foreign and domestic governments, their policies and their troop presences, do not ultimately determine the opportunities available to most women -- the men in their families do. Progress and change must be acceptable to men as well as accessible to women.

In addition to the difficulty of encouraging men to see women's participation in society differently, some Afghan women themselves may struggle to redefine their roles. Donor organizations may not take into account the extent to which traditional, conservative gender roles are just as stubbornly ingrained in many Afghan women's minds as they are in many Afghan men's minds -- the notion that men provide, and that women are provided for.

While there are exceptions, in general rural Afghan women have been reared to see their domain as the home, and their job to raise children and serve their husbands. Thus, many may feel that any ambitions outside of the home are unnecessary, or that they aren't capable of achieving them. Furthermore, the prospect of taking on some traditionally male-dominated responsibilities, or even having a stronger presence outside of the home -- such as working or seeking higher education -- simply may not be desirable or even considered within the realm of possibility to some women.

A rural/urban dichotomy pervades Afghan history, which  has shown that signs of ‘modernization' in Kabul do not necessarily signify fundamental changes in the rest of the country. What looks like great progress in women's equality in Kabul to the Western eye is often just a veneer, not the true picture. The visibility of women in Kabul in the workplace and in schools and universities, often without a burqa, gives the impression of notable change, but Kabul holds only a very small representation of Afghan  women. While about 1.5 million women reside in Kabul, 13.5 million women live in rural areas and are not affected by the more lenient cosmopolitan environment in the capital.

Moreover,one must consider that if a woman wears a burqa, it may not be that she is forced to but, rather, that she chooses to. Personal choice is still important, even if one's society may limit one's choices. And while it is absolutely vital that female representatives have a voice in the peace and reconciliation process, as well as seats in parliament and other highly-visible opportunities, the significance of these and similar advancements is currently limited to symbolic importance.

Assuming that such social realities will persist far past 2014 into the next several decades, the key is to change attitudes gradually, working within current cultural boundaries. Before concentrating emphasis on women working outside of the home, the main focus now should be on expanding women's roles and voices inside the home. The majority of Afghan men I have spoken to about this do not oppose the idea of their wife, sister, or daughter working outside the home or pursuing further education; rather, their opposition to it in practice comes from a fear of how others in their community or extended family may judge them. Breaking a cultural taboo sparks a plague of gossip that has the potential to destroy a family's reputation, particularly when it concerns the integrity of women, who represent a family's honor.

Women throughout the country can and do capitalize on their abilities in socially and culturally acceptable ways already. There are many examples of women who have started small, home-based enterprises, fulfilling a community or market need through activities such as in-home embroidery or carpet-weaving, keeping poultry to sell eggs, or tending bees to sell the honey and wax, which can all be supported with micro-finance grants.

Investment must also be made in vocational training for rural women. In this regard, the people who can best fulfill the needs of Afghan women are other Afghan women. Trained midwives in Afghanistan could be encouraged to teach others the skills of midwifery, while women who are literate could be supported to organize and teach literacy or Quran study classes in their homes.

Such home-grown efforts should be supported through locally-tailored, Afghan-led programs that provide micro-finance assistance and vocational trainings. Programs should appeal to and involve men, as well, helping them see the positive aspects of enabling women. For example, I once met an older woman from Bamyan who had learned how to install solar panels and had then enlisted the help of her brothers to start a solar panel installation and repair company servicing her community.

If a woman can contribute to her family or community in culturally acceptable ways, men may start to recognize women not just as a housekeeper and caretaker, but also as an individual who can generate some income for the household or make needed contributions to the community, placing women on a more level playing field with men. Furthermore, such activities give women a sense of achievement and boost self-esteem, attitudes that are invariably passed down to future generations.

Aside from contributions inside the home, women and girls should also be shown and told of their gender's potential and rights outside of the home. Generating public dialogue and story telling of exemplary women in the community, religion, or country through radio programs that seed messages of women's empowerment in communities far outside of Kabul is one way to accomplish this.

Education is another invaluable form of empowerment, and the progress made in women's education, even in rural areas, is commendable. Education can breed a hunger for knowledge, one that Afghan girls (and boys) are experiencing now as schools proliferate across the country. Their mothers, as well, may curiously observe their children studying in the evenings and be inspired to seek out education. While girls' enrollment in primary school was up to 2.4 million in 2010 from 5,000 during the Taliban regime, according the Afghan Ministry of Education, Afghan girls today rarely progress to secondary and high school, yet there is still promise of a generational process of change. If a mother never attended school, but she fights for her daughter's right to do so, one can hope that the granddaughter would eventually be in a position to attend high school or even university.

Women also need to see that they have some place in the public sphere. Culturally acceptable places for women to gather publicly such as women-only parks, prayer areas, and public gathering spaces, need to be created so that women can feel comfortable and have a sense of belonging in some place outside the home. It is rare to find a place delegated for women to pray in a mosque in Afghanistan, which is a shame for a country that places Islam at center of its society. Finding a restaurant in Jalalabad that accommodates women, even accompanied by close male relatives, is a challenge. Just one park in Kabul is dedicated to women.

While the impending withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2014 has dredged up the topic of the fate of Afghan women, mainstream aid efforts to help Afghan women have been generally off-target, in a society and culture that the international community can sometimes be quick to judge, but resistant to comprehend. The ‘Afghan women' topic has become a talking point for politicians, a popular focus area for donors, and a dramatic headline for media, all demanding too much, too fast from a mainly rural society bound tightly to its conservative culture.

NATO should not be cast in the role of savior -- the idea that NATO should be responsible for safeguarding Afghan women's rights is to make the patronizing assumption that foreign money, applied with foreign standards, in the midst of a foreign-led war, is the key to launching a culture and society into a more Western-style one. The aim should be to encourage and support Afghan women, and men, to make changes in their own lives, on their own terms, and at their own pace.

A grassroots democracy for Afghanistan

This article first appeared on the AfPak channel of foreignpolicy.com on June 27, 2011
The Malik-ul-Malik System and a Representative Afghan Government

During the 2009 presidential elections, when I was serving as a senior aide to candidate Dr. Ashraf Ghani, I used to share a taxi with other travellers going from Kabul to my home town of Jalalabad every weekend. Thousands take that road each day, many either going to or returning from Pakistan - mainly for healthcare or trade. With so many Afghans taking this road, it was an opportunity to gauge public opinion on the elections. I would introduce myself as a university student to get uncensored thoughts from fellow passengers about the topic. I didn't always have to bring it up--as soon as the journey commenced, an analysis of the presidential elections would inevitably begin.

Their opinions would almost always be that the so-called democracy in Afghanistan is a Western-imported and -imposed form of government. The international community footed the bill for the 2009 presidential elections, worth hundreds of millions of dollars; however, according to the Afghanistan Independent Election Commission (IEC), only about one-third of registered voters visited the polls, approximately 5 million of the roughly 15 million Afghans who registered. Common knowledge is that wide-spread vote rigging, ballot box stuffing, and various frauds and corruption discounted the legitimacy of elections, as the counting dragged on for months in uncertainty.

After the disaster of the elections-and the candidate I supported having lost- I began reflecting on the electoral system as it exists in the country today. The general public, especially those in the rural and insecure areas, has been alienated by the central government through this counter productive system. The 2010 parliamentary elections exposed more flaws in the current system, when 2,577 candidates vied for 249 seats. News reports and independent studies documenting the elections evoked the same nightmares of fraud, corruption, low turnout, and illegitimacy from the 2009 presidential elections. Too many of those who made it to the parliament are not truly representative of their constituencies, but instead are often warlords and regional strongmen whose power has been bolstered through their strong political ties and bribery.

For the past 10 years, Afghanistan has been pushed to emulate a Western model without room for its democracy to sprout from Afghan customs and cultures. It's not democracy itself that dismays in this country; rather, it is the way it has been installed and implemented that many find so frustrating. States such as Turkey and Indonesia show that Islamic nations can construct their own forms of democracies, but it must be custom-tailored to make sure democracy can function in each local context.

As reflected in the voices of those I shared taxis with, and others with whom I spoke, Afghans have become cynical about their government. Today, many take for granted the corruption and inevitable failure of elections to secure a representative central government.

Despite this, Afghans pride themselves on their history of a kind of democracy--decisions on both local and national levels have been made by consultative councils of tribal elders (shuras or jirgas) and grand councils (loya jirga), respectively, throughout Afghanistan's history. An alternative, sustainable, and effective approach to the current failed system must stem from traditional Afghan democracy, such as the malik system.

Afghan societies function internally. Local governance is no exception to this societal structure, with communities traditionally turning to local non-government entities, such as shuras, composed of village leaders (maliks), and religious leaders (mullahs), for legal matters, conflict resolution, and issues concerning social and economic needs. This is the basic Afghan localized system of governance--a tribal or village elder, or malik, is elected or, rather, selected, through consultation and mutual agreement in a community jirga or shura.  The malik then represents the village's needs and interests to external parties and deals with any internal matters. Very rarely do Afghan citizens living outside of urban centers feel inclined to contact local government officials or their respective members of parliament for issues or regarding services that should theoretically be provisioned by the central government under the current system.

A 2010 national survey conducted by the Asia Foundation shows that when faced with social or economic problems, or in need of dispute resolution or services, the vast majority of respondents approach a non-government entity, either the village shura or jirga, or the malik or mullah. The number one reason given by respondents for seeking out local governance entities was simply their faith that local shuras would be honest and fair.  In fact, the majority of respondents said they did not believe that the parliament was working in the interest of ordinary Afghan civilians, but rather, in individual political interests.

This continued reliance on informal justice systems, mixed with knowledge of the history of Afghan governance, suggests that rural-dwelling Afghans (about 75 % of the population) don't benefit or find much use for parliament, or its electoral processes, as it exists in Afghanistan today.

This customary system of local governance is how Afghans have governed themselves for centuries, even after formal centralization in the 1880's when Amir Abdur Rahman unified the state, albeit by force, and after 1964, when King Zahir Shah established a parliament, albeit one with restricted power. The founder of modern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Abdali, was elected to be king by a loya jirga of tribal elders. While such arrangements have been sustained at the local level, there has been a consistent failure to duplicate such effectiveness, efficiency and trust in popular representation at the central level, particularly in today's Afghan parliament.

An alternative approach would be to extend the traditional malik system to the central level. It would establish linkages from the grassroots to the central government, and be sustainable and affordable. Under an indigenous Afghan system of democracy, the idea would be to limit the current election system to the cities and instead adapt the malik system into a formalized process of democratic governance that would reach its way to the central level, resulting in actual popular representation.

In this system, each village would elect or select their malik after convening a jirga, as is traditionally done. The elected village maliks would collectively form a district council. Eligibility requirements could be put in place to ensure that those elected to the village and district shuras are full-time residents of their constituencies, in order to edge out warlords and commanders who are often granted parliament or ministerial positions through political or financial coercion. The district council would then convene to elect one district representative--a malik-ul-maluk (chief of the chieftains) from amongst themselves to represent the district as a whole at the central level within the parliament. Provincial jirgas could be established and convened regularly, along with a term set to allow for routine turnover. In this way, members of parliament would be directly connected to the localities they represent, serving as a direct line for voicing the needs and interests of their constituencies. To avoid a swollen bureaucracy, some districts could be coupled together based on their demographics to meet the target of 249 seats, or elected maliks could also be placed in the Provincial Councils.

Afghanistan is not ready for a centralized Western-style democracy, perhaps because it's just not suited for the system created after the fall of the Taliban. Few Afghans have confidence in their elected representatives, and even fewer have any use for them; thus, Afghans take little to no interest in voting, particularly with the levels of corruption that strips elected officials of their true representative function. However, a certain style of democracy is woven into the fabric of Afghan society, both through religion and culture-it must be allowed to crawl first before it can be fast-tracked. Building on the existing democratic structures in the country, such as the malik-ul-maluk system, from the local to the national level, could produce the best form of representative parliament, one that comes from amongst the people, is affordable and sustainable for the country, and one that would ensure effective, grass-roots outreach for the government.

This generation must stop paying the price for the damages of the past!

Which generation?
We may refer to them as the ‘young generation’, young not only because of their age but also because of their immature thinking and struggling. Let me try to define this generation:
Any Afghan who currently struggles and thinks about saving Afghanistan and the prosperity and harmony of Afghans, or at least has such hopes for them. Any Afghan (old or young), who has not killed a fellow Afghan, has not been involved in looting and predatory actions in this country. Any Afghan who has not fallen deep into the extreme left or right to the extent that he or she considers that killing innocent Afghans is justifiable or any Afghan who has not had any part in stealing the assets of the government of Afghanistan. Any Afghan who has not undermined the morals and values of this country in order to serve others’ ideologies or any Afghan who has not committed atrocities and caused the destructions of Afghanistan just so to make his/her foreign backers happy. Any Afghan who does not sacrifice the interests of Afghanistan for his/her own personal or sectarian’s interests.
This Afghan human being is included in ‘this generation’ which fortunately makes the majority in Afghanistan. My words refer to this ideal generation. I call it the ‘young generation’ and I repeat once again that by ‘young’, I do not mean young in age but innocent individuals with clean conscience.
This generation must not pay the price for the past mistakes which were the result of political games. Nowadays, if a young man/woman is killed, deprived of humane living conditions, without access to school, college or fair work conditions, withheld from leading a healthy business, kept back from a place to live and suffering from psychological disorders, these are all due to the consequences of the past and present unhealthy politics. Has this generation ever asked itself; “Why are the culprits of current atrocities still holding power and ruling over the ‘young generation’? Why are they still abusing this generation and stripping it its assets? One of the reasons is that we are unnecessarily lost in our past and we tend to forget about today and the future.

The Problem
We are still fighting over history; we are still wasting our valuable time defending or condemning those faces that are part of history and so unable to do anything useful for our present and future.
At gatherings, political discussions, press conferences, on Afghan websites and during meetings, I witness that instead of discussing our destiny and thinking the way forward, the ‘young generation’ engages in supporting or decrying those figures that cannot make a positive contribution for this generation. One considers a politician clean and respectable while others see him as a warlord, a criminal and a traitor. Similarly, some stand up in support of one side while others denounce them. This is how this generation wastes its energy and valuable time to the extent that quit often their arguments lead to hostilities. Some try hard to find evidence for their claims and force others to accept their counterarguments whereas they never question the benefits and advantages of problematic discussions which sometimes even turn violent. Will such unhealthy rivalry lead to a constructive change in their lives? One of the negative consequences of Afghanistan’s wars and crisis is that our ‘young generation’ has been coerced into getting involved in discussions of history. I do not encourage the ‘young generation’ to take revenge for the past generation but I just ask them to forget about the past. I do not deny the fact that we should learn from the past and historical experiences but I do not want anyone to lose himself or herself, getting lost and vanishing in history. The ‘young generation’ should study history in as far as it helps them learn from the wrongdoings of the past in order to prevent similar mistakes from occurring again and renew and develop the positive experiences of history.
When I mention history, I don not imply a history that is centuries old. Yesterday is a part of history, the last thirty years are also part of a history that apart from some exceptions does not have any significant value. One of the exceptions is that lessons from our near past should be taught to widen our understanding and experiences beyond this part of history which had made us neither independent nor rich. Millions of us were killed yet we are still poor and hungry, still under others’ influence, deprived and helpless.
If two young Afghans smash each other’s head in support or opposition to this or that Khan, Ustad, leader, commander or any other disputed figure while these powerful figures are not even aware of the “sacrifices” made by their “supporters”, how will this contribute to the betterment of the ‘young generation’?
The ‘young generation’ (the innocent generation) pays for the mistakes and the crimes of the past by taking part in problematic arguments. Unfortunately, paying this price is extremely expensive and has almost caused a vicious cycle. On the one hand, the loss has deprived this generation from everything and has resulted in their being abandoned in a dry desert with nothing in hand. On the other hand, this loss has caused the generation to become involved in a psychological war, a war from which this generation has not been able to rescue itself. This loss has not only stolen everything from this generation but has made this generation get lost in search for clearing or accusing controversial figures while losing its ability to work for a brighter future. This is indeed the biggest loss. Guilty politicians have turned the young generation into their defenders, clearing the politicians’ reputation. On the one hand, these politicians abuse the innocence of the ‘young generation’ to hide their crimes. On the other hand, they try to deter progress of the ‘young generation’ because if the ‘young generation’ tries to progress, the guilty politicians can no longer show their true faces to people. They want the people to thank them for being worse than worst.

Solution
Everything has ended!
We need a new beginning!
The incidences and events of the past are just lessons for us. We need to renew and develop the best lessons and bury the worst ones in the graveyard of history. Beyond this, we should separate our relationship with our near past. A new Afghanistan cannot be built by the elements that have already been tested. The Afghanistan of today and tomorrow will be built only by this young thinking, young acting and innocent generation. This generation should devote time to building this country.
The solution is that the ‘young generation’ must no longer pay the price of the crimes, mistakes, wars and betrayals of the past. The politics of the past were imposed on us so that some figures could come to power, becoming fat and rich. We no longer want to burn in the fires created by the perpetrators of old politics. We should no longer make ourselves tired and exhausted in praising or condemning them. This generation can only afford to spend its time, stamina and knowledge to build its today and future and forget its bitter past.
Today, if we are hungry, ignored, isolated, deprived, have nothing, far away from education and development, unfortunate, taken hostage, and have no leaders - doesn’t this mean that we have nothing from our near past to be proud of?
Shouldn’t we feel ashamed of our past, at least the nearer past? Aren’t the players of the past guilty of the current atrocities and problems? Therefore, if we do not forget the past and do not move forward and do not roll up our sleeves to get out of these crises, wont the generations of tomorrow blame us the same way we blame the previous generations? And god forbid, wont they consider us accountable for all deprivations caused?
A major part of national awareness is to turn the attention of the ‘young generation’ to the future. Do not look back, look forward for the present and the future or else our heads will eventually hit the stone.
The guilty political players of the past cannot help you. They just want to use you to present them as clean and innocent and that is it. They want to hide themselves behind your innocence and carry their stolen assets on your shoulders. Throw them away, wake up and brighten your fellow citizens up and search new ways for a prosperous Afghanistan.

Pay attention
Some names may appear big and important, but you are more powerful than them. You have a cleaner conscience than them and you are more trustworthy in society than them. You can do it. You can find solutions for the crisis of trust and believe that they have caused.
These words are not mere slogans. They are a call for awakening and for creating awareness of national movement. Start everything from the beginning and do not pay the price for the mistakes of the past any longer! It is not worth wasting our time in justifying or condemning crimes, sins and so-called prides of the past. Do not cause pain and agony to each other for the sake of the past because you are innocent. Do not get involved in sectarian differences; these cannot offer anything to you but will take everything away from you. Do not follow “colours”; make a white and clean future. This is the way for awakening and brightness.

English translation: Fazel Fazly

Malak-ul-Maluk, an alternative for the current MPs?

If cardboard and paper were edible, the poor of Kabul city could live on the posters and billboards of the parliamentary candidates of 2010 for almost a month. Most of those who voted would agree with me that it wasn’t the posters that influenced their decision to vote. Then why such a huge waste of money? And the cluttering of our own cities? I would argue the fault lies in the system itself.

Democratic institutions have to happen naturally and evolve organically for them to be effective and representative, which is not the case with the Afghan parliamentary system. It has been forced from the beginning, and after a 9 year trial period, clearly isn’t working. In the last parliament, only a handful of the MP’s ever visited their constituencies. For the majority it wasn’t possible as they feared for their lives. This lead to the alienation of the public, especially those in the rural areas, because their voices could not be reached.

The recent parliamentary elections of 2010 were a prime example of the collective failures of the past 9 years of the experiment in Western-style democracy that this country has become. There were 17.5 million eligible voters though only 4 million showed up to vote, most of them the urban population in cities. That is only 23% percent of the eligible voters leaving 77% behind– meaning further alienating them from the current Afghan government. It clearly isn’t working as it is supposed to. It is too forced and doesn’t connect well with the fibres of rural Afghan society.

The alienation of rural Afghans could have been stopped the first time if the parliament was actually a representation of the people. Voting should lead to representation of the people, not just be undertaken as part of the democratic machine. If one part of the machine doesn’t work -- in this case, the voting process and fair representation of the people, then the entire machine is broken!

The 2010 elections saw a huge number of candidates – 2,500 for 249 seats. The extravagant amount of money spent on the campaigns by corrupt candidates made the honest ones disappear as if they never existed. In addition to the money spent by the candidates, it cost the government 150 million USD which the international community paid for. What did we get by the end of it? We got a non-representative parliament full of warlords and the facilitators of corruption. The country is not able to sustain this type of false representation, and for what? It doesn’t even work!

Perhaps a better alternative would be to limit the current elections system to the cities and instead adapt the local system of malaks (informally elected village chieftains) in the rural areas into a formalized process that would result in more actual popular representations. Here’s how it would work: Each village would elect their malak, and the village malaks would collectively form a district body. The malaks of the district would then elect a malak-ul-maluk (chief of the chieftains) from amongst themselves to represent the district as a whole in the parliament. This way the MPs would really be from amongst the people, and would be connected to their constituencies; thus, serving as a direct link back to their constituencies throughout the provinces. Some districts can be coupled together based on their population and geographic size to meet the target of 249 seats in the parliament. The mix of the two systems could produce the best form of representative parliament, one that is from amongst the people, affordable and sustainable for the country, and one that would ensure effective outreach for the government. A real, representative democratic machine, home-grown in Afghanistan.

The grave yard of empires...

The last time I wrote something for this blog was November 2008 – almost two years ago. That was just a few months after I moved to Afghanistan. I always thought I had a writer’s block but a recent chat with a couple of my friends in Kabul made me realize it wasn’t.

Most of the people that write about Afghanistan are either not Afghans or those who live abroad. Even the professionals that do see what it is like here are only here for a few days or weeks at a time which is not enough to realize the truth before they can write about it. Their perception is what they import with them and then their experiences later exported back in the form of articles. Almost never do their opinions jotted down are separate from their imported thoughts.

Afghanistan – the empires’ graveyard – is a complex state or what today is called a country under that name. The multi-cultural state is not only diverse in terms of languages, religions and social dynamics but also varies in opinions and perceptions from one village to the other in each one of the ~398 districts of the country. Understanding them all and trying to do the right thing has always been a challenge for the Afghan puppet government no matter whose puppet it was or is.

Every puppet prime minister/president imports their own ideologies from their master state; thinking it is the best for the country. This is of course without conducting an intensive research or even a mere opinion research to understand what the locals want. It is always assumed that what the leaders or the master state thinks is right must be the right approach. Of course, they are the ones pouring money so it should be, shouldn’t it?

Afghanistan is not like anywhere else in the world. Understanding its differences may take decades if not centuries but are the key to peace and stability here. Money cannot buy anything other than the time of temporary pimps of the land. When the money is over those pimps will be the first to turn against their masters.

Anyway, I don’t want to talk about the government or policies of the invading nations. It is a series of topics for the future. All I wanted to point out was that the longer you spend in Afghanistan the more imprisoned you feel; and that feeling make you wonder about the future. However, that feeling is not enough to stop you from writing about the country but it is rather the challenge of trying to stay positive.

Negativity seems to be the trend here amongst the writers without a real analysis, which is just too easy to write about since the majority of the readers want that. However, there is much more to this country – things that are real. It doesn’t matter whether it is sad news or joyful, it needs to be reported as it is! That is all I am asking for – reporting without any biases. Understand the country and its culture first before you write or make comparisons. What may look like backward to you may be a step forward to many ordinary Afghans.

As I mentioned before most of the people writing about Afghanistan have never lived here for long enough (more than a few weeks/months). They write based on their short term livening experience, their comparison with their childhood experiences if they were born here, their ideology and/or their wishes and that can never be real.

As for the Afghan bloggers; most of the active ones either live abroad where they feel safe and it is most easy to write based on their comfort or are paid to do so by their foreign masters. They are far away from the reality and the sentiment on the ground. Bring them out in to the reality and I promise they will lose their minds (if they have one to start with of course) because all of a sudden they will not be living in the dreamy bubble they built for themselves. A majority of them (the Afghan writers/bloggers) are fascists and for some reason, perhaps for their ignorance, they are proud of that.

It is time we change that! And the way forward would be to write about the realities on the ground without any fear. If we lose our lives doing that then consider it our sacrifice in the effort to rebuild our nation. I am not a proud Afghan but rather ashamed of it! To me it is not important what we were a long time ago but what we are today. Pride will take us nowhere but shame will make us build our country so that one day our children can be proud of it.

Shame on those who destroyed our country! Shame on those who still are! And shame on the greedy pimps that are selling Afghanistan out for their own financial/personal gains!

Let’s build a future we, our children or grandchildren, can all be proud of for real one day!

Long live Afghanistan!